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ABSTRACT 
The question whether commercial surrogacy should be prohibited, allocated to a free market or 
regulated has been highly contested since the appearance of the modern form of surrogacy in the 
1970s. 
This paper is going to illuminate the question what the right approach might be from an economic, 
moral and legal perspective. 
After giving information about the different forms of surrogacy and the market and its background, 
the paper will give an overview of the contemporary legislation and its development on an 
international level. It will be shown that the legislative tendency is to prohibit commercial surrogacy 
as opposed to 'altruistic' - unpaid - surrogacy. 
Following an economic analysis and evaluation of moral concerns the author comes to the conclusion 
that neither the total prohibition of surrogacy, nor the prohibition of paid surrogacy is justified neither 
from an economic nor from a moral point of view, but that detailed regulation would be able to 
address the concerns and risks involved. 
Subsequently, the question how the surrogacy market should be regulated in detail will be considered 
and the author offers a suggestion of a tentative framework. However, the examination will reveal 
that the discussion about how the relevant concerns should be addressed is at least as controversial as 
the discussion 
Therefore it is suggested that legislative trend of prohibiting surrogacy, might not only be because of 
policy reasons, but because of the controversy about the detail of such a regulation. In fact, a detailed 
regulation of the surrogacy market would inevitably meet with criticism from both the advocates and 
opponents of surrogacy. 
WORD LENGTH 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes and bibliography) comprises 
approximately 14,996 words. 
Surrogacy - Preconception Contract 
Regulation 
Economic Analysis 
1 
I INTRODUCTION 
Surrogacy, in its broader meaning, namely that a women bears a child for 
another, 1 goes evidently back to at least biblical time.2 Nevertheless, in recent 
years, it has played an increasing role as more and more childless couples are 
considering surrogacy for four mam reasons: increasing infertility, new 
technological possibilities, the dismantling of the traditional conception of family 
and sex, and on top of this, the lack of babies for adoption.3 
Contemporary controversy about surrogacy started with its modern 
emergence towards the end of the 1970s,4 and reached its climax during the eighties 
with the famous Baby M case in 1988, where the surrogate mother refused to 
surrender the child.5 Since then numerous countries have introduced legislation 
concerning surrogacy and although there is highly divergent legal regulation on an 
international level - from non-regulation to total prohibition - the legislative trend 
seems to be towards the prohibition of paid or commercial surrogacy as opposed to 
unpaid or ' altruistic' surrogacy. This trend is also reflected in the new New Zealand 
legislation.6 However, whether surrogacy should be allocated to a free market, non-
commodified, or something in between is still highly contested, both amongst 
academics and the public. 
This paper is gomg to examme the question of the right approach to 
surrogacy from an economic and a social/ moral point of view and challenges both 
the international legislative trend and the new New Zealand legislation. 
1 Peter Singer and Deane Wells The Reproduction Revolution: New Ways of Making Babies (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1984) 107. 
2 With Abraham' s wife Sarai being infertile she told Abraham to take her handmaid Hagar as 
concubine so that they may obtain a child by her. (The Holy Bible, Old Testament, Genesis 16: 1-2). 
Elizabeth Kane Birth Mother (Sun Book, Melbourne, l 990) 222; Michael J. Trebilcock The Limits of 
Freedom of Contract (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2003) 48 [The Limits of Freedom of 
Contract]. 
3 Anita Stuhmcke "For Love or Money: The Regulation of Surrogate Motherhood" 3 Murdoch 
University Electronic Journal of Law 1996 No. I , available from 
<http ://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v3n 1/stuhmck l .html#text20> (last accessed 5 July 2005) I. 
4 Kane, above n 2, 213. 
5 Baby M, I 09 N.J. 396 (S .C. New Jersey 1988). 
6 See Vanessa S. Browne-Barbour "Bartering for Babies: Are Preconception Agreements in the Best 
Interest of Children? (2004) 26 Whittier L.Rev 429, 437, 438. Browne-Barbour also distinguish 
between commercial surrogacy, involving a third party as for example agencies, and paid surrogacy 
without the involvement of third parties. This distinction is not made in all the other relevant 
literature. 
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Chapter II provides information about the different forms of surrogacy and 
the surrogacy market and its background. Chapter III gives an outline of the 
legislation of surrogacy both on an international level and in New Zealand. Chapter 
IV considers whether surrogacy should be prohibited, allocated to a free market or 
regulated in detail. I examine this question from an economic and social/ moral 
perspective and argue that neither the allocation to a free market, the total 
prohibition, nor the prohibition of commercial surrogacy is the right approach, but 
that a detailed regulation might be able to address all concerns. Chapter V discusses 
the individual issues raised by regulation. It will show that the individual aspects of 
any regulation are at least as much contested as whether surrogacy should be 
prohibited itself. In conclusion I also suggest a tentative framework for regulation. 
Finally, Chapter VI concludes that a targeted intervention is possible to address all 
the concerns and therefore prohibition is not justified. Finally, I suggest that the 
trend to prohibit paid surrogacy, as opposed to 'altruistic' surrogacy, might be 
founded in the regulatory difficulties rather than policy reasons. 
II SURROGACY7 
A Classification 
1 Definition8 
Surrogacy is the practice by which a woman who is, or is to become, pregnant agrees 
permanently to surrender the child born of that pregnancy to another person or couple, with 
the intent that the other person or couple will be the parent or parents of the child. The 
woman who bears the child is known as the surrogate mother and the person or persons to 
whom the child is surrendered are known as the commissioning or intended parent or 
parents. 
7 
The terminology used for surrogacy and the related contract are: surrogate motherhood (or 
mothering) , surrogate parenting (contract) , surrogacy arrangement or contract, contract pregnancy, 
preconception contract. 
8 
John Seymour and Sonia Magri "A.RT. , Surrogacy and Legal Parentage: A Comparative 
Legislative Review" (Victorian Law Reform Commission, Melbourne, 2004) 31. 
3 
2 Kinds of Surrogacy 
The first distinction is in regard to payment: With 'altruistic' or unpaid 
surrogacy the surrogate mother9 receives no payment or only the reimbursement of 
reasonable expenses, whereas with 'commercial' or paid surrogacy a fee is paid to 
the surrogate." 10 
Another distinction is made in regard to the genetic material used. Surrogacy 
can be divided into two main types: the more traditional type is 'partial' surrogacy, 11 
which is facilitated by artificial insemination, 12 whilst 'full' or gestational surrogacy 
involves in-vitro fertilization, 13 which is a more innovative technology and was 
therefore only developed in recent years. 14 Each of these two types of surrogacy 
presents multiple situations. 
(a) 'Partial' Surrogacy 15 
'Partial' surrogacy is the classical and probably still most common form of 
surrogacy agreement, where a childless couple consists of a fertile male and an 
infertile female. 16 The surrogate is artificially inseminated with the sperm of the 
male, whilst in more rare cases the child might also be conceived by sexual 
intercourse. 17 The surrogate is paid for surrendering the child to the couple. 18 With 
'partial' surrogacy, the surrogate is the biological mother of the child to be born, 
whilst the male partner of the intended parents is the biological father. However, the 
9 The woman becoming pregnant and bearing the child is referred to as surrogate mother or surrogate. 
10 Stuhmcke, above n 3, I ; Seymour and Magri , above n 8, 31; National Bioethics Consultative 
Committee (Australia) "Surrogacy Report I " ( 1990) 9 ["Surrogacy Report I "]. 
11 Seymour and Magri , above n 8, 31. 
12 Artificial Insemination was applied to human beings in the United States as early as 1884 but only 
became more common in the 1970s. Richard A. Posner, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
1992) 420 [Sex and Reason]; Tim Schlesinger "Assisted Human Reproduction: Unsolved Issues in 
Parentage, Child Custody and Support" (2005) 6 I J. Mo. B. 22 22; James C. O' Neill "Alternatives 
to Adoption: Social and Legal Implications of Alternative Reproductive Modes" ( 1983) Working 
Paper No.20, University of Waikato Department of Sociology, Hamilton 6. 
13 Browne-Barbour, above n 6, 435. 
14 "Surrogacy Report I", above n I 0, 6; O'Neill, above n 12, 48; Stuhmcke, above n 3, 2. 
15 The term 'partial' surrogacy refers to the fact that with this form of surrogacy, the children might 
be biologically related to one of the intended parents. Stuhmcke, above n 3, 2; Seymour and Magri, 
above n8, 31. 
16 Seymour and Magri , above n 8, 31. 
17 Seymour and Magri , above n 8, 3 l. 
18 See also Sex and Reason , above n 12,420. 
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sperm could also come from a sperm bank, so that the would-be-parents are not 
related to the child. 19 Furthermore, it would be conceivable for a gay couple to 
engage in a surrogacy contract or even for a single man to have a child on his own.
20 
(b) Gestational ('full') surrogacy 
Gestational, 'full' or 'in vitro fertilization' surrogacy means that a woman's 
egg is fertilised outside the womb and then implanted in the uterus of another 
woman, the smTogate mother. 21 In this kind of surrogacy the surrogate mother is not 
genetically linked to of the child and so is not its biological mother. 22 This type of 
surrogacy might be considered when the woman can produce eggs but is not able to 
carry a child, so the intended parents might be the biological parents.23 Reasons for 
women to have a child without pregnancy can also be, for example, health reasons, 
or she may also not want to give birth for aesthetical or career reasons.24 With 
gestational surrogacy the egg needs not to come from either of the contract parties. 
If in addition donor sperm is used, neither of the contract parties might be 
genetically linked to the child.25 Going further, surrogacy could also facilitate 
cloning. 2627 
B Facts about the Market and its Background 
Before evaluating the surrogacy market and its regulation, it is beneficial to 
obtain an overview of its scope and particularities. 
19 Browne-Barbour, above n 6, 436. 
20 
Sex and Reason, above n 12, 424. 
21 Sex and Reason, above n 12, 420. 
22 Browne-Barbour, above n 6, 435 . 
23 
Susan Downie Baby Making: The Technology and the Ethics (The Bodley Head, London, 1988) 
14. 
24 Downie, above n 23, 146. 
25 Sex and Reason, above n 1, 425, 434; Browne-Barbour, above n 6, 436. 
26 
Cloning is the genetically copying a human being. See, for example, definition in Zealand New 
Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004, s 5. 
27
Gena Corea The Mother Machine: Reproductive Technologies from Artificial Inseminination to 
Artificial Womb (Harper & Row, New York, I 985) 264. 
5 
Approximately 6.1 million people of child-bearing age are infertile in the 
United States.28 That is approximately one out of every six married couples.
29 
Despite this already high number, the infertility rate is meant to increase further, 
especially due to environmental pollution.30 In contrast with the large amount of 
infertile people, the number of healthy babies available for adoption is 
approximately thirty thousand.31• This discrepancy is noteworthy as the surrogacy 
market is partly an alternative market to the adoption market.32 Some authors even 
see the surrogacy market as a consequence of the strict regulation of adoption.33 But, 
in fact, the surrogacy market is not a total alternative to adoption, as it offers more 
possibilities, especially to uphold a genetic line.34 
In the United States until 1986 an estimated 500 children, were born through 
surrogates,35 and by the mid-1990s this number increased to 4000.36 Today, it is 
estimated that in the United States every year thousands of children are born due to 
surrogacy arrangements.37 In the U.K., even though commercial surrogacy is 
prohibited, it is estimated that every week a child is born to a surrogate mother. 38 
The average price paid to the surrogate is US$ 10,000.39 However, using an 
agency, a couple may expect to pay in total up to US$ 25,000 - 50,000, of which the 
major amount goes to the medical costs and the agency fees. 40 In the 1980s the 
28 Browne-Barbour, above n 6, 433; Schlesinger 22. 
29 Stacy Christman Blomeke "Note: A Surrogacy Agreement That Could Have and Should Have 
Been Enforced: R.R. v. M.H. , 689 N.E.2d 790 (Mass. 1998)" (1999) 24 Dayton L. Rev. 513,5 14. 
30 The infertility rate increased from 3.5 per cent to 9.7 percent between l 965 and l 982. Peter H. 
Schuck "Reflections on Baby M" ( l 988) 76 Georgetown L. J. l 793, l 796. 
31 Browne-Barbour, above n 6, 433. 
32 B lomeke, above n 29, 5 I 4. 
33 Posner, Richard A. "The Ethics and Economics of Enforcing Contracts of Surrogate Motherhood" 
(1989) 5 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol'y 2 1, 22. 
34 Richard J Arneson "Commodification and Commercial Surrogacy" ( 1992) 2 1 Philsophy and Public 
Affairs I 32, 146; Sex and Reason, 422; Iris Leibowitz-Dori, "Womb for Rent. The Future of 
International Trade in Surrogacy" ( 1997) 6 Minn. J. Global Trade 329,329. 
35 "The Ethics and Economics of Enforcing Contracts of Surrogate Motherhood", above n 33, 
22. 
36 Browne-Barbour, above n 6, 433. 
37 Browne-Barbour, above n 6, 434. 
38 Browne-Barbour, above n 6, 465. 
39 "The Ethics and Economics of Enforcing Contracts of Surrogate Motherhood", above n 33, 
22; Brinig Friedlander, Margaret "A Maternalistic Approach to Surrogacy: Comment on Richard 
Epstein's Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement" ( l 995) 81 Va. L. Rev. 2377, 
2384. 
40 Downie, above n 23, l 26; Browne-Barbour, above n 6, 437. 
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intended parents spent more than US$ 33 million rn more than 1200 surrogacy 
arrangements in the United States.41 
There seem to be four main motivations for women to enter into a surrogacy 
arrangement: money, altruistic motives, enjoying pregnancy without wanting to 
have another child, and overcoming a birth-related trauma.42 In fact, in regard to the 
last motive, 1/3 of surrogates had undergone an abortion or given up a child for 
adoption before.43 Most stated that they became surrogates because of altruistic 
motives, although money has been an additional incentive.44 
In regard to surrogacy contracts themselves, it is estimated that only 1 per 
cent of surrogate mothers wanted to keep the babies.45 This rate is very low 
compared to adoption where up to 75 per cent of the women change their mind.46 
The average surrogate mother is 25 years old, married, and has already 
children and a high-school education.47 Whilst the surrogate comes mostly from the 
lower middle class,48 the would-be-parents in general come from the upper middle 
class and are well educated.49 
Ill REVIEW OF THE CONTEMPORARY REGULATIONS OF SURROGACY 
This Chapter gives an outline of the legislative approach to surrogacy on an 
international level. It will show that, although there is highly divergent legal 
41 Leibowitz-Dori, above n 34, 341. 
42 
Hal B. Levine "Gestational surrogacy: Nature and culture in kinship" (2003) 42 Ethnology 173 4. 
43 Downie, above n 23, 119, 120. 
44 
Downie, above n 23, 119; "Beyond Doctrinal Boundaries: A Legal Framework for Surrogate 
Motherhood", above n 45, 2349, Schuck, 1799. 
45 
Lori B. Andrews "Beyond Doctrinal Boundaries: A Legal Framework for Surrogate Motherhood" 
( 1995) 81 V. L. Rev. 2343, 2351. 
46 Andrews, above n 45, 2351. 
47 
This figures refer to a 1983 study with 125 potential surrogates in the United States. Downie, 
above n 23, 122. 
48 
But see "Beyond Doctrinal Boundaries: A Legal Framework for Surrogate Motherhood", above n 
45, 2349. 
49 
Anne Kaplan "The Politics of Surrogacy Narratives: Notes toward a Research Project (Parts I & U) 
in Susan Ostrov Weisser and Jennifer Fleischner (ed) Feminists Nightmares: Women at Odds, 
Feminism and the Problem of Sisterhood (New York University Press, New York, 1994), available 
from 
<http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/rt2 l/procreative/Kaplan.htm> (last accessed I July 2005) 
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regulation at an international level, the legislative tendency 1s to prohibit 
commercial surrogacy as opposed to 'altruistic' surrogacy. 
A New Zealand 
Towards the end of 2004 New Zealand passed two new Family Law Acts 
concerning surrogacy: The Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004,50 
which has been in force since 21 August 2005, and the Status of Children 
Amendment Act 2004, which has been in force since 1 July 2005.51 
The Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004 prohibits 
commercial surrogacy and makes it an offence. 52 Additionally, advertising for 
commercial surrogacy is prohibited and an offence.53 Section 14 (1) of the Act 
makes also clear that surrogacy arrangements are not illegal but unenforceable. 
B United States 
In the United States laws vary from state to state, from total prohibition to 
allowing it under certain requirements to non-regulation54 In Arizona, Michigan and 
the District of Columbia, surrogacy contracts are expressly forbidden and made an 
offence, regardless whether they are paid or unpaid. New Mexico, Utah and 
Washington only prohibit payment to a surrogate. In other states, for example 
Nebraska, legislative provisions that declare surrogacy arrangements either void 
and/ or unenforceable are most common. In some of these states, unpaid surrogacy 
arrangements are excepted and, thus, valid.55 There are also states like New 
Hampshire, Virginia, Florida and Texas where surrogacy arrangements are 
50 The New Zealand legislature showed a very good sense of humour when it in section 2 (2) 
established that the Act comes into force after 9 months of the Royal assent. 
51 Mark Henagham Care of Children (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2005) v. 
52 New Zealand, The Human Assisted Technology Act 2004, s 14 (3). Section 3 (b) of the Human 
Assisted Technology Act 2004 points even out that "to prohibit certain commercial transactions 
relating to human reproduction" is one of the purposes of the Act. 
53 of The Human Assisted Technology Act, s 15 . 
54 European Society of Human Reproduction & Embryology 2002 Press releases 
<http://www.eshre.com/emc.asp?pageid=439> (last accessed 05 July 2005). 
55 Seymour and Magri, above n 8, 34. 
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authorised and regulated.56 However, around half of the states have not implemented 
1 . . d f 57 any regu at10n m regar to surrogacy so ar. 
C Canada 
In Canada, the Assisted Human Reproduction Act 2004 prohibits the 
payment of consideration to a surrogate mother and also the payment to a third party 
for the arrangements of surrogacy. However, the surrogate mother might receive 
compensation for "expenditure incurred in relation to her surrogacy if a receipt is 
provided" and also for work-related income loss under certain conditions.58 
D Australia 
In Australia, like in United States, the legislation varies from State to State. 
In Victoria, Australia commercial surrogacy is illegal and all surrogacy 
arrangements are considered void.59 The corresponding legislation was passed in 
November 1984 and proclaimed in August 1986. Therefore Victoria was one of the 
first states of the world to outlaw paid surrogacy. 60 Since 1994, in the Australian 
Capital Territory commercial surrogacy is also prohibited, and surrogacy contracts 
are void and unenforceable. 61 
In Queensland and South Australia both 'commercial' and 'altruistic' 
surrogacy arrangements are illegal. In Tasmania paid and unpaid surrogacy 
arrangements are void and unenforceable.62 
E United Kingdom 
In the UK, surrogacy became regulated in 1985 with the Surrogacy 
Arrangements Act 1985. Following the Government's Warnock Committee, 
56 Seymour and Magri, above n 8, 36. 
57 Browne-Barbour, above n 6, 444. 
58 Seymour and Magri, above n 8, 43. 
59 Stuhmcke, above n 3, 3. 
60 Downie, above n 23, 156. 
61 Browne-Barbour, above n 6, 465. 
62 
Seymour and Magri, above n 8, 47; Stuhmcke, above n 3, 4, 5. 
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commercial surrogacy was banned, making it a criminal offence to advertise 
surrogate services, recruit surrogates or operate agencies.63 The Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Act 1990 amended the 1985 Act to make surrogacy arrangements 
unenforceable.64 However a payment for expenses up to£ 10,000 is accepted.65 
F Other European Countries 
In Austria, Germany66 , Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden and Norway 
surrogacy is prohibited.67 In Finland, Greece and Ireland, surrogacy is practised and 
there are no legislative provisions. France, Denmark and the Netherlands prohibit 
payment to surrogate mothers.68 
G Rest of the World 
In the majority of Middle East countries, surrogacy is prohibited. The 
Islamic Research Council damned surrogacy contracts in a report from 2001.69 
Costa Rica even made the prohibition of surrogacy a constitutional provision.70 In 
China, Hong Kong and Japan surrogacy is also prohibited,71 whereas Buddhist law 
allows surrogacy.72 In India non-commercial surrogacy is accepted and commercial 
. d d' . 73 surrogacy 1s un er 1scuss1on. 
IV FROM TOTAL PROHIBITION TO ALLOCATION TO A FREE MARKET 
- WHAT IS THE RIGHT APPROACH TO SURROGACY? 
This chapter offers an economic analysis of the surrogacy market, followed 
by a discussion of the social, moral and ethical concerns. Subsequently, I examine 
the question, what the right regulatory approach to commercial surrogacy might be -
63 Downie, above n 23, 135. 
64 Canadian Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, s 36 (2). 
65 Browne-Barbour, above n 6, 465. 
66 In Germany surrogacy is an offence under § I (I) 7 ESchG for the acting doctor. 
67 Browne-Barbour, above n 6, 462. 
68 http://news.bbc.eo.uk/ I /hi/health/background_briefings/ 193076.stm <last accessed 15.09.2005>. 
69 Browne-Barbour, above n 6, 461 . 
70 Browne-Barbour, above n 6, 462. 
7 1 Browne-Barbour, above n 6, 462, 465 . 
72 Browne-Barbour, above n 6, 464, 465. 
73 Browne-Barbour, above n 6, 466. 
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whether commercial surrogacy should be prohibited, allocated to a free market, or 
regulated. I will also consider whether the tendency to prohibit commercial 
surrogacy as opposed to 'altruistic' surrogacy is justified and come to the conclusion 
that this is not the case. 
H Economic Analysis 
Even though a market economy consists of decentralised (many buyers and 
sellers) and self-interested decision-making (everyone looking for his or her own 
wellbeing rather than the well-being of the whole society ), market economies have 
in fact shown to be successful in allocating scarce recourses in a way that is welfare-
enhancing overall. In his book A Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth 
of Nations in 1776, economist Adam Smith made the famous observation that 
market participants are acting as if they are guided by an "invisible hand", leading 
them to a desirable outcome.74 
The initial point is the basic economic theory that when voluntary market 
transactions are allowed, economic efficiency will be attained, which means that 
resources are allocated in a way that affords their most valuable use, thus 
maximising social economic welfare.75 This state of economic efficiency is called 
Pareto optimality, which stands for a situation where no person can be made better 
off without making at least one other person worse off.76 
Hence, when a market reaches a state of Pareto optimality and, thus, the best 
possible allocation of the resources for society, there is no need for market 
intervention. Furthermore, any intervention by the state would disturb this market 
equilibrium and economic efficiency. This would decrease the social welfare and is 
consequently not desired. 
Therefore, from an economic point of view, a particular market transaction 
should be allowed and the contract in question enforceable when it leads to a Pareto 
74 
Gregory N. Mankiw Principles of Economics (2 ed, Harcourt College, Orlando, 200 I) 9. 
75 
Anthony T. Kronman, and Richard A. Posner The Economics of Contract Law (Little, Brown, 
Boston, Toronto, 1979) l. 
76 
Edward E. Zajac Political Economy of Fairness (The MIT Press, Massachusetts, 1995), 13. 
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improvement, which means an outcome, where at least one person is made better of 
and none is worse off.77 Economists perceive voluntary and fully informed (none of 
the parties lacks relevant information) transactions generally as mutually beneficial 
to both parties and, thus, the society, as it is assumable that a party would not enter 
into a contract without believing him or herself to be better off.78 This view, that 
voluntary and fully informed transactions are generally welfare enhancing and thus 
should be permitted, is also the basis for the concept of freedom of contract. 79 
In regard to surrogacy contracts, from an ex ante point of view, provided that 
they enter voluntarily and fully informed into the contract, both parties are better 
off, as neither the couple nor the potential surrogate mother would enter into the 
contract without believing they will gain advantages out of the contract. 80 The 
childless couple would not enter into the contract without thinking that the benefit 
they gain by obtaining a child is more valuable than the money they pay. The 
surrogate mother enters in the contract as she regards the money she receives, and 
which she can use in her favour, as more valuable than the disadvantages involved 
in the pregnancy and the fact that she has to give the child away. Additionally, the 
surrogate mother might improve her welfare by satisfying her altruistic motives. 81 
1 Voluntariness 
However, the above mentioned, economic perception that a surrogacy 
agreement is automatically mutually beneficial is only valid when both parties 
voluntarily enter into the contract. Economists tend to assume that this is generally 
the case. Nevertheless, the question, whether entering in the surrogacy contract is 
voluntary, is seen as an issue from the side of the intended surrogate mother rather 
than the couple. 
77 <http ://en .wikipedia.org/wiki/ Pareto_efficiency> (last accessed 5 July 2005). 
78 Anthony I. Ogus Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2004) 
16. 
79 Kronman and Posner, above n 75, 2. 
80 "The Ethics and Economics of Enforcing Contracts of Surrogate Motherhood", above n 33, 
21, 23. 
81 "The Ethics and Economics of Enforcing Contracts of Surrogate Motherhood", above n 33, 22; 
Kaplan, above n 49, l. 
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Generally, if a woman enters into a surrogate arrangement, it can be assumed 
that this is the expression of her free will, as she is a free person and no one forces 
her into the contract. 82 In contrast, critics of surrogacy emphasise that poor women 
in a desperate situation might have no choice but to become surrogate mothers.83 
According to Trebilcock, "there is a clear danger of the commissioning parents or 
their agent opportunistically exploiting these circumstances and, in effect, coercing 
the birth mother into entering into an arrangement that in less constrained 
circumstances she would not have considered."84 
However, as Trebilcock notes, " ... voluntariness is an elusive and complex 
concept."85 Especially, the border between economic coercion and voluntariness is 
difficult to determine. Trebilcock makes the crucial point, when he suggests: "In a 
world where scarcity confronts all of us, few of us have any constrained choices in 
any exchange relationship into which we enter".86 In the end, everyone is subject to 
economic coercion. For example, most people would prefer not to work full-time, 
however the great majority does so, as they need to earn a living.87 
Consequently, even if I agree that there might be the risk of exploitation of 
poor women, I regard this problem not as an issue of voluntariness in an economic 
context but rather as a social problem which I will further discuss within the moral 
and social concerns. 
2 Market failures 
The basic economic concept also does not work when there are situations 
that prevent the market from reaching economic efficiency, so called market 
82 Gena, above n 27, 227. 
83 Gena, above n 27,230. 
84 
The Limits of Freedom of Contract, above n 2, 53 . 
85 
Michael Trebilcock "The Lessons and Limits of Law and Economics" (2005) 
(available from <http://www.crdp.umontreal.ca/fr/activites/evenements/050 I 25MT_texte.pdf> (last 
accessed 25. September 2005) (revised and updated version from "An Introduction to Law and 
Economics" ( 1997) 23 Monash Law Review 123) 39 ["The Lessons and Limits of Law and 
Economics"]. 
86 
The Limits of Freedom of Contract, above n 2, 123; "The Lessons and Limits of Law and 
Economics", above n 85, 39. 
87 
See also Alan Wertheimer, "Two Questions about Surrogacy and Exploitation" ( 1992) 2 1 
Philosophy and Public 'Affairs 2 11 224. 
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failures. 88 Market intervention is, therefore, not only justified but desired, when it 
can efficiently address market failure and the benefits of the regulation outweigh its 
costs.89 There are four kinds of market failures, which might prevent Pareto 
optimality: market power, public goods, externalities and information 
asymmetries.90 
(a) Market power 
Underlying the theory about economic efficiency is that there is a fully 
competitive market, which means that the price is not manipulated through market 
participants, because of their power. Such market concentration is not an issue with 
a free market in surrogacy, as there are many surrogate mothers and couples that 
would like to enter in the contract. The personal service and the duration of 
engagement are further factors that prevent market power. As a result, there is no 
market power concern that would need to be addressed by intervention. 
(b) Public goods 
Another market failure occurs, where the market trade concerns a public 
good. A public good is neither excludable nor consumable. This means no one can 
be prevented from benefiting from it and one person's enjoyment of the good does 
not prevent others from enjoying it in the same way. Therefore, public goods result 
in a free rider problem, which means that other persons can benefit from this good 
without paying.91 Even if the product might be social desirable, no one is willing to 
pay for a product he might enjoy free and, consequently, the market fails to achieve 
a socially beneficial outcome.92 Surrogacy is not a public good, as other people 
cannot use and enjoy the surrogate's service, because of the nature of the surrogacy-
service. Furthermore, other people can also not 'enjoy' the child as much as the 
88 <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Market_failure> (last accessed 5 July 2005). 
89 Margaret J. Radin "Market-inalienability" ( 1987) I 00 Han,ard law Review 1849, 1862. 
90 Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen Law and Economics (4ed, Pearson Addison Wesley, Boston, 
2004) , 44. 
91 "The Ethics and Economics of Enforcing Contracts of Surrogate Motherhood", above n 33 , 42. 
92 Richard A. Epstein "Surrogacy: The Case for Full contractual Enforcement" (1995) 81 Ya. L. Rev. 
2305, 2309. 
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intended parents. Consequently, this market failure also does not play a role m 
regard to surrogacy. 
(c) Externalities 
Externalities are external effects of a market transaction. This means that 
stakeholders other than the parties are affected by the contract and this external 
effects are not taken into account by the parties in their decision making process and 
the third party also does not receive or pay compensation. Even if a transaction is 
mutually beneficial to the parties, negative effects on others than the contract parties 
(negative externalities) might prevent Pareto improvement and, furthermore, lead to 
a net decrease of social welfare. 93 
(i) Negative effects on the child to be born 
In regard to surrogacy, an externality which might affect Pareto 
improvement is the possible negative effect on the unborn child.94 The concerns 
about the welfare of the child to be born are unquestionably the most important issue 
in regard to surrogacy.95 However, from an economic point of view, the child cannot 
be disadvantaged by the contract, but only benefit from it, as it derives its life from 
the contract. Even if one assumes that children born through surrogacy are worse off 
than 'normal ' children, it is not assumed that their life would be so much worse as to 
regard it as net disadvantage at all, especially in regard to the notion that the life is 
the most valuable asset.96 
In summary, from an economic point of view, there even does not exist a 
negative externality which would warrant governmental intervention, as the children 
only can benefit from the contract. Nevertheless, despite this economic analysis, the 
93 
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94 
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question whether there are negative effects on the children which need to be 
addressed remains and will be discussed within the social and moral concerns. 
(ii) Negative effect on existing children and the partner of the surrogate 
Externalities might also occur in regard to potential negative effect on the 
existing partner and/ or children of the surrogate.97 It is particularly feared, that the 
existing children might be psychologically affected, and might especially fear also 
being given away.98 On the other hand, it is argued that those effects on the 
surrogate's other children can be widely avoided by "honest explanation and 
emotional security".99 Moreover, the money the surrogate gains from the 
arrangement might substantially improve the quality of life of the whole family and 
so be in their favour. 10° Consequently, whether the surrogacy arrangement leads to a 
net benefit or a disadvantage for the partner or existing children cannot be said in 
general but rather depends on the circumstances of each individual case. In light of 
the lack of empiric study, to evaluate psychological harm is difficult and it must be 
taken into account that many kinds of women's 'normal' decisions, are able to 
(psychological) harm family members. For example, when a mother engages in a 
full-time job, children maybe harmed, because of lack of attention and care. The 
potential psychological effects also depend on the psychological conditions and the 
relation of the persons to each other. Furthermore, the possibility of harm is much 
higher when a mother, for example, decides to leave the family, although this is not 
prohibited by law. 101 
In summary, potential negative effects on the children and the partner might 
in specific cases occur and lead to a market failure, which is at least not significant 
enough to justify prohibition of surrogacy. Finally, it is also arguable whether the 
risks are material enough to require being addressed by regulation at all, as will be 
discussed below. 
97 Carol Sanger "Great Contracts Cases: (Baby) M is for the Many Things: Why I Start with M" 44 
St. Louis L.J. 1443 1458. 
98 Elizabeth Anderson. Value in ethics and economics (Harvard UniversityPress, Cambridge, l 993) 
[Value in ethics and economics] l 72; Brinig, above n 39, 2384. 
99 Downie, above n 23 , 145 
100 The limits of Freedom of Contract,, above n 2, 49. 
101 See also Epstein, above n 92, 2322. 
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(iii) Negative effects on children available for adoption and other "soft 
externalities" 102 
A further and less apparent possible negative effect on third parties concerns 
children that are available for adoption, but are unwanted. 103 It is argued that 
surrogacy would have a negative effect on those children, when childless couples, 
without the opportunity of surrogacy, might adopt such a disadvantaged child 
instead. From an economic point of view, this issue cannot count as externality, as 
losing the chance of being adopted, is only a foregone opportunity to obtain a 
benefit, to which no legal right exists, which, therefore is not considered in an 
economic analysis . However, the question will be considered again as part of the 
moral/ social concerns. 
There are a number of other positive and negative external effects of 
surrogacy arrangements, so called "soft-externalities". '04 A possible positive third 
party effect could be the would-be-grandparents desperately hoping for a 
grandchild. In the end every market transaction has numerous positive and negative 
external effects, even if they are very indirect. Taking all these external effects into 
account is impossible; therefore, only direct third-party-effects that are of certain 
significance can find their way in an economic analysis. 105 
To sum up, there are no material externalities which would justify 
prohibition of surrogacy. As set out above, the only negative externality which 
might occur regards negative effects on the surrogate's family. However, as already 
argued this externality is not material enough to justify prohibition and it is also 
questionable whether it needs to be addressed at all, which will be discussed below. 
102 Epstein, above n 92, 2323 . 
103 
Especially disabled, black and older children. "The Ethics and Economics of Enforcing Contracts 
of Surrogate Motherhood", above n 33, 22, 24; Radin, above n 89, 1931. 
104 
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(d) Information failure 
Information failure can prevent Pareto improvements. When the positive 
outcome of a market transaction anticipated by a party is misevaluated because of 
lack of information, the transaction might not lead to a net benefit in terms of 
welfare. '06 
In regard to surrogacy, information failure may occur, as women cannot 
weigh up the psychological and physical disadvantages they may suffer, especially 
those women who have not borne a child before. The surrogate might, for example, 
be required to give up her job or certain hobbies or even be forced by the doctor to 
undergo certain medical treatment, even surgery. She also might suffer harm from 
the pregnancy and the birth, and the birth also carries the risk of dying. 107 Finally, 
the information deficit most discussed is that women might not be able to accurately 
evaluate the psychological harms they might suffer from having to give the child 
away. ,os 
However, Posner repudiates that such information failures arise. His 
argument is that surrogate mothers are in general women that have already children 
and are older than 20 years, thus able to evaluate the negative effects of a surrogacy 
agreement. 109 In this regard it is suggested that a fertility test for the women is "too 
expensive and intrusive" and therefore couples would rather engage women who 
have children, therefore the market would be self-regulating, and a restriction 
obsolete. 110 Moreover, in fact, the data indicate, that the majority of women are able 
to properly evaluate the effects of the surrogacy arrangement, as , for example, less 
than one percent of surrogate mothers wanted to keep their child. 111 Nevertheless, 
even if this percentage is very low, it indicates that those information deficits 
106 "The Ethics and Economics of Enforcing Contracts of Surrogate Motherhood", above n 33 , 24. 
107 See also see "Beyond Doctrinal Boundaries: A Legal Framework for Surrogate Motherhood", 
above n 45, 2350. 
108 See for example see "Beyond Doctrinal Boundaries: A Legal Framework for Surrogate 
Motherhood", above n 45 , 2351 . 
109 "The Ethics and Economics of Enforcing Contracts of Surrogate Motherhood", above n 33, 25 . 
110 Downie, above n 23, 145 
111 "Beyond Doctrinal Boundaries: A Legal Framework for Surrogate Motherhood" , above n 45 , 
2351 . In comparison 75 % of women that consider adoption change their mind after the birth of the 
child. 
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occur. 112 Moreover, assuming that the majority sun-ogates know from previous 
pregnancy what they might expect does not mean that the information costs do not 
occur at all. Hence, Posner' s argument is not convincing. 
Andersons argues the opposite view, that women cannot foresee emotional 
consequences, even if they already have children and that, therefore, women always 
will have information deficits. 113 I agree that even if women that already have 
children can better foresee what the pregnancy and birth will bring, this does not 
mean that they might not have information deficits at all. Every pregnancy and birth 
seems different and they may still underestimate the fact that they have to give the 
child away. However, to assume that, therefore, women always have information 
deficits seems also to be too extreme, as even if there obviously are women that 
misjudge the consequences of the surrogacy an-angement, many women seems to be 
able to well evaluate the psychological and physical 'costs', as, for example, the 
very low rate of sun-agates wanting to keep the child indicates.
114 
To summarise, there might be cases where women underestimate the costs 
they may face when engaging in sun-ogacy arrangement. Information failure may 
occur and need to be addressed. However, they can be directly addressed, for 
example, by giving the woman the chance to change her mind, as will be discussed 
below. Therefore, they do not justify prohibition. 
Additionally, there might be an information asymmetry as the sun-agate, 
when she is fertilised with the sperm or the egg is implanted, does not know about 
possible genetic diseases of the donor(s), which might lead to complications or be 
hereditary. The other way round, the intended parents might not have information 
about diseases or han-nful behaviour of the woman. However, from my point of 
view such potential information asymmetries need not to be addressed by 
governmental intervention, as the parties can solve these information deficits 
11 2 
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themselves by contractual provisions. 115 Thereby for example the contract can 
provide for compulsory health tests , and should also stipulate who has to bear the 
costs.' 16 Moreover, the reality shows so far that both the couples and the woman are 
choosing their contract partners well, because of their concern for the welfare of the 
child and the close connection surrogacy brings about. 117 
In summary, an information failure which might occur is the problem that an 
intended surrogate might not be able to outweigh the physical and psychological 
costs the contract might generate. 
3 Conclusion 
As a result, the economic analysis shows that there are market failures which 
need to be addressed. Although I come to the conclusion that there is not a problem 
of voluntariness and that there are also no market failures in regard to monopoly and 
public goods, there occur externalities and information failure, which warrant 
governmental intervention. However the arising market failures can be balanced by 
a targeted intervention and, therefore, prohibition is not justified. 
I Beyond the Realm of Economic Analysis - Social and Moral Concerns 
about Allocation to a Free Market and their Significance 
Economic analysis is a very helpful tool in evaluating whether the state 
should intervene in a particular market. Nevertheless, it only can be a starting point. 
Especially in regard to such a highly controversial subject like surrogacy, there are 
numerous social, moral, and ethical issues that are not taken into account in an 
economic analysis, but need to be considered.
11 8 
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1 Concern about the welfare of the child to be born 
Potential negative effects on the children to be born have already been 
mentioned in the economic analysis, but have not been further examined, as, from 
an economic point of view, they are outweighed by the fact that the child derives its 
life from the contract. Therefore the question whether there are potential negative 
effects on children and whether those need to be addressed by governmental 
intervention is considered in the following. 
119 
Critics seem to assume that the fact that the child is born through a surrogacy 
arrangement makes it automatically worse off than natural born children. However, 
I argue that this is not necessarily the case. In fact, even adopted children, who are 
not genetically related to either of their parents, are, according to surveys, in general 
no less happy or stable than others. 
120 The notion that children are disadvantaged if 
they are not brought up by their biological parents and within a traditional family 
does not match the social reality anymore, as a great number of families do not 
comply with this model any longer. In fact, in the United States every second child 
has been at least temporarily living in a single parent household.
121 Additionally, 
there are no indications that children born through surrogacy are nowadays socially 
or legally discriminated against.
122 Surrogacy might even be an advantage for the 
child, as negative factors, such as "unwanted pregnancy, poor parental health 
(emotional and physical) and the use of harmful drugs ... " and the resulting risks for 
the child are less likely to be present. 
123 The American Fertility Society stated: "A 
child conceived through surrogate motherhood may be born into a much healthier 
climate than a child whose birth was unplanned."
124 
It is further claimed that the child might be distressed at finding out that it 
was given away by its mother for money. 
125 However, the child would probably not 
be harmed more seriously when it was given away for adoption for other reasons, or 
11 9 Seidmann, above n 96, 1833. 
120 "The Ethics and Economics of Enforcing Contracts of Surrogate Motherhood" , above n 33, 1123. 
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was accidentally conceived and regarded as a burden by its parents, or neglected in 
the battle of separation. 126 
Nevertheless, there remain risks for the children to be born, for example, 
when they do not fulfil expectations or are disabled, and both of the contract parties 
refuse to care for them. 127 Furthermore might children also be harmed when the 
intended parents are totally incapable to adequately care for the child's needs. 
However, these risks can be addressed by specific regulation, as will be discussed in 
Chapter V and, therefore, do not justify prohibition. 
2 The commodification argument 
The commodification argument is the most significant argument against paid 
or commercial surrogacy. The critics of surrogacy raise objections against the 
commodification of both the child and the mother. 
( e) Commodification of the child 
Surrogacy is undoubtedly a contract to 'produce' babies and is, therefore, 
condemned by its critics as baby-selling. 128 The Swedish Insemination Committee 
stated for example in its 1985 report: "[Surrogacy] presumes that children become 
objects of financial bargaining." 129 In this context it is argued that seeing children as 
goods and giving them a market price would degrade their humanity, and, as a 
consequence of this, our conception of personhood. 130 The concern is that when we 
start to treat children as exchangeable goods with a market price we will 
automatically start to perceive all children as commodities and, going further, not 
only children but all human beings. Therefore, this so called domino effect might 
126 See also Seidmann, above n 96, 1833. 
127 The Limits of Freedom of Contract, above n 2, 53. 
128 Radin, above n 89, 1928; Sex and Reason, above n 12, 423; Thomas A. Shannon Surrogate 
Motherhood: The Ethics of Using Human Beings (Crossroad, New York, I 988) 157. 
129 Downie, above n 23, 140. 
130 Elisabeth S. Anderson "ls Woman's Labour a Commodity? ( 1990) 19 Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 71, 72. 
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produce an inferior concept of humans, ourselves and others. 
131 A further fear about 
baby selling is that children will be conceived as exchangeable 'commercial items' 
and, in consequence, in the long run the attributes of children, like eye-colour, 
intelligence quotient etc. could be assigned a market price. 
Baughman makes clear that "if we choose to define the transaction in the 
same way we define 'baby-selling', the selling of a child to a totally unrelated adult, 
we have already condemned the transaction by definition".
132 To equate surrogacy 
to baby-selling would mean conceiving of the child as the surrogate's property. 
133 
As long as we do not presume the child to be the property of its parents - and which 
reasonable person would seriously do so? - the issue is not baby-selling, but rather 
the sale of parental right. 134 Nevertheless, Anderson does not agree that there is a 
difference; she maintains that payment for giving up parental rights is morally the 
same as baby-selling. 135 Radin also regards the argument, that as long as the child is 
not conceived as property, surrogacy cannot be baby-selling, as implausible, as paid 
adoption is widely recognised as baby-selling. 
136 
However, apart from this, there are further differences between surrogacy 
and baby-selling. The surrogate mother is not selling an existing child, as the 
contract is made before conception, and the intended parents are paying for her 
service. 137 The attributes of the child cannot play a role in the contract and thus not 
be commodified. The parties would hardly see the price paid to the surrogate mother 
as a price for the baby, but rather as a price for 'service' of the surrogate mother. 
Additionally, in most cases the surrogate mother is not selling her baby to strangers, 
but is rather paid to give up her parental rights in favour of the other biological 
parent or parents. 138 Furthermore, even if the intended parents are not biologically 
linked to the child, they have "some active connection to the conception of the 
131 
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child", be it through selection of the donor sperm or eggs, even if indirectly m 
engaging a donor clinic. 139 
(f) Commodification of the surrogate 
Other critics see surrogacy rather as the selling of the 'gestational service' of 
the women and compare surrogacy therefore with prostitution, or even slavery. 140 
To make this criticism clear, the language used to describe the surrogate ranges from 
"living incubator" to "flesh-covered test tube". 141 In regard to this view, surrogacy is 
seen to degrade the dignity and the personality of the woman and to lead to self-
alienation, because of the use of the body, in particular its reproductive capacity. 142 
The basic notion of this perception is that the body is an integral part of the person, 
and ought not to be commodified. 143 
However, despite this notion, selling of body parts is not entirely 
condemned: The sale of eggs, sperm, blood and hair, even if parts of the body, is 
allowed and social accepted. On the contrary, the sale of human organs is 
tabooed. 144 With surrogacy, the woman is also not selling her entire body. The 
decisive question is what has to been seen as an essential and untouchable part of 
the body and how the surrogate's reproductive capacity is to be classified in this 
context. The acceptance of the commodification of eggs, sperm and blood can be 
explained as being only a part of the body and in comparison with human organs 
renewable. Applying this distinction, surrogacy might also be seen as acceptable as 
the woman is only selling a part of her body, namely her reproductive capacity, 
which is furthermore renewable, as she can become pregnant many times. 145 
Nevertheless, the argument about bodily integrity goes further. It is claimed 
that the woman not only sells her reproductive capacity but "the pregnancy contract 
139 Baugham, above n 125, 287 (emphasis in original). 
140 Radin, above n 89, 1929; also for example Corea who argues for a criminal ban of surrogacy. 
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denies mothers autonomy over their bodies", because the intended parents could, 
through the contractual provision, "exercise potentially unlimited control over the 
gestating mother's activity".
146 The concern is that the intended parents might try to 
exercise excessive control over the surrogate through contractual provisions. 
However, this problem of "potential abuse" is not inherent in surrogacy contracts 
but also applies to many work relationships, where the unequal bargaining position 
in regard to employment is balanced through labour legislation.
147 Therefore it is 
suggested, that potential exploitation of the surrogate can not only be dealt with by 
prohibiting surrogacy, but by regulation, as will be discussed below.
148 
The Commodification argument also contains an 'utilisation' argument: It is 
argued that surrogacy violates the woman's personality as she is used as a means to 
the ends of others. 
149 Another concern is parallel to the concerns about the 
commodification of the child, that the women's attributes could be given market 
value. 150 Trebilcock makes the point when he states: "Scenarios are constructed 
where surrogacy fees would vary depending on the physical and mental attributes of 
a birth mother akin to different breeding fees associated with the rearing of pedigree 
livestock." 151This view misconceives the complex motives women generally have 
for entering into surrogacy contracts. 
152 Surveys show that the vast majority of 
surrogate mothers entered into such a contract not for purely monetary reasons, but 
more complex 'altruistic' reasons.
153 Furthermore, contracts are generally accepted 
in family law, without the objection that they commodify the familial bonds.
154 
Marriage contracts are common, regardless of the (romantic) notion that people 
should marry for love and monetary reasons do not have to play a role in regard to 
marriage. Moreover, it is also not unusual that allocation of child custody is 
outweighed by financial conditions in a divorce 'package'. 
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147 See in general Debra Satz "Markets in Women 's Reproductive Labour" ( 1992) 21 Philosophy and 
Public Affairs l 08, I 08. 
148 Baugham, above n 125,290. 
149 Value in ethics and economics, above n 98, 80; The Limits of Freedom of Contract, above n 2, 50; 
Rae, above n I 33, 54. 
150 This argument plays mainly a role in regard to 'partly' surrogacy, because of the genetic 
contribution of the surrogate. 
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In summary, I regard the comrnodification argument both in regard to the 
child and the surrogate as exaggerated and unconvincing. The basic assumption that 
the acting people attach a market price to the child and the surrogate in regard to 
their attributes does not meet reality but is exaggerated. 155 As far as it is claimed that 
those scenarios might become reality, once surrogacy becomes more common, the 
feared scenarios can easily be avoided by reasonable restriction of the market, as 
will be suggested in Chapter V. 156 From my point of view the commodification 
argument does not warrant prohibition. 
3 The exploitation argument 
The exploitation argument is based on the assumption that, allocating 
surrogacy to a free market, poor and disadvantaged women might be exploited, as 
they might be inclined to enter in a surrogacy arrangement because of their 
desperate situation. 157 This argument corresponds to the in the economic analysis 
mentioned voluntariness issue. 
This objection does not prove to be significant in practice up to date, as the 
facts show that most surrogate mothers, even if they were in need of money, have 
not been poor, but come from the lower middle class. 158 Furthermore, a childless 
couple would hardly tend to choose poor women, because of health concerns, which 
might jeopardise a successful pregnancy. 159 Nevertheless, in fact, there is a 
remaining risk of exploitation of poor and undereducated women. However, the 
other way round, prohibiting surrogacy would deny the chance for poor women to 
improve their situation by gaining money through surrogacy. 160 This dilemma that 
both prohibition and allowance might make poor and undereducated women worse 
off is described by Radin as double-bind. 16 1 Furthermore, prohibiting surrogacy 
155 See also Arneson, above n 34, 144, who states that those scenarios are speculated because of the 
intuitive fear of new social challenges. 
156 See also Arneson, above n 34, 142. 
157 Arneson, above n 34, 155 ; Wiegers, above n 131,176; Marsha Garrison "Surrogate Parenting: 
What Should Legislature Do?" ( 1988) 22 Family Law Quarterly 149 150. 
158 Kaplan, above n 49, 4; ) Gena, above n 27, 229. 
159 Sex and Reason, above n 12, 424; Epstein, above n 92, 2317 . 
160 Radin, above n 89, 1929; Seidmann, above n 96, I 831. 
161 Radin , above n 89, 1929. 
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might lead to a black market, where the exploitation of poor women is the more 
likely. 162 
4 The unfairness argument 
A further objection to permitted surrogacy is that it is unfair that surrogacy is 
reserved to rich couples, whilst poor couples cannot afford to enter into a surrogacy 
contract. This argument is not convincing. The average sum paid in a surrogacy is $ 
10,000 which the average couple can afford. 163 Furthermore, we live in a capitalistic 
world in which poor people are disadvantaged in many regards and prohibiting 
surrogacy would not improve their situation at all 
164 Additionally, the unfairness 
argument must been seen in the context of general criticism of market economy 
rather than a specific critique of the surrogacy market. 
5 The decline of the established family model 
A further objection is that allowing surrogacy would contribute to the decline 
of the established family model. 165 The American Fertility Society for example 
stated in its guideline from 1986 that "there is concern that surrogacy will weaken 
marriage and ' the family'". This opposition is mainly based on the Roman Catholic 
notion that procreation has to take place within marriage. 166 The Vatican condemns 
surrogacy, as well as the surrounding reproductive techniques like artificial 
insemination, insisting that children can only be created by marital intercourse. A 
Vatican Instruction from 1987 even urged legislators to ban all kinds of reproductive 
technology, including surrogacy.167 This religious and conservative conception of 
family, which, for example, also forbids extramarital sex, has in the last decades 
been undermined due to social change. Even if the family is still seen as an 
important social value, such a strict view of family is, in our modern society, no 
longer supported by the general opinion. Moreover, the vast majority of children 
162 G . b am son, a ove n 157, 343. 
163 Anderson, above n 29, 74. 
164 "The Ethics and Economics of Enforcing Contracts of Surrogate Motherhood" above n 11 26. 
165 ' ' The Limits of Freedom of Contract,, above n 2, 49. 
166 The Limits of Freedom of Contract,, above n 2, 49. 
167 Between Strangers, above n 121, 162. 
27 
would still be born within families. Thus, the fear that surrogacy might harm our 
conception of families is also negligible in regard to the limited scope of the 
surrogacy market. 168 
As far as it is argued that people abiding by the traditional model might be 
affected as surrogacy undermines their moral values, it must be said that, the other 
way round, prohibiting surrogacy for this reason, would mean forcing their values 
upon others, who do not share them. 169 People who are of the opinion that surrogacy 
is immoral "need not become involved", but they do not have the right to stop others 
from engaging in it. 170 In this context it is argued that the state should be neutral in 
regard to the conflicting moral ideals and that therefore a prohibition is not 
justified. 171 
6 Parent-child bonding 
The relational bonding between parents and their children is seen as 
important ideal. Another argument against a free market in surrogacy is, therefore, 
that surrogacy violates this ideal, as the biological mother has to give her child 
away. Undoubtedly, the mother carrying the child and the child develop a close 
relationship through the phase of pregnancy itself. 172 However, the reality shows 
that surrogate mothers in general, even if they develop this close relationship to the 
baby, do not see this baby as their own baby. 173 Secondly, a modem view would not 
conceive bonding as only related to the genetic parentage or the birth-giving, but 
much more to the fact of living together and sharing experiences. 
168 
"The Ethics and Economics of Enforcing Contracts of Surrogate Motherhood" , above n 11, 26. 
The number of children born through surrogacy arrangements .in the United States was 4,000 until 
the mid- I 990s. Even if it is estimated that meanwhile thousands of children are born through 
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170 Downie, above n 23 , 143, see also Epstein, above n 92, 2326. 
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7 Feminist objections 
Feminists differ over the question whether surrogacy is strengthening the 
role of women and thus has to be appreciated or whether it is a curse, devaluing 
women. 174 On the one hand, it is argued that surrogacy confines the woman to her 
biological role thus fortifying gender inequality. 175 On the other hand, it is argued 
that the woman should have the freedom to enter into a surrogacy contract, as it is 
her personal decision to use her reproductive capability for the benefit of others and 
to gain money. 176 The freedom of using her "procreative liberty" would not oppress 
but empower the woman. 177 This feminist camp goes further and claims that the 
prohibition of surrogacy would be sexual discrimination, as sperm donors and 
'womb donors' are comparable, and men are allowed to sell their sperm for 
money. 178 In the end feminists hold two opposed extreme views about the effect of 
surrogacy on gender roles. However, I regard the feminist criticism about surrogacy 
as insignificant. As women are in general free to enter into a surrogacy arrangement, 
I cannot see that the surrogacy confines women to her gender role. 
8 The unwanted children free for adoption 
As discussed under externalities in the economic analysis, a further concern 
about surrogacy is that it might eliminate the chances of children that are available 
for adoption, especially those that are unwanted because of birth defects, age or skin 
colour. However, this argument seems to be questionable, as probably only a very 
few couples would be inclined to choose this alternative, rather than trying to find 
another way or even preferring to stay childless. Additionally, to refer childless 
couples to the adoption of such a deprived child instead, seems to be unfair as they 
are not responsible for this social problem and even might not be capable of coping 
with such a child. 179 
174 · W1egers, above n 131 , 175 . 
175 Baugham, above n 125, 273. 
176 
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Asides from that, even if there would be enough children for adoption, the 
possibility of adoption cannot produce an argument against surrogacy, because, if 
that would be the case, it must also be considered to restrict the reproduction of 
fertile couples, so that they instead of creating a new child they adopt an existing 
child. Carrying on one could also ask whether it would make sense to prohibit 
reproduction entirely and to redistribute children, especially from third world 
countries, so that those children barely having enough to eat would be cared for 
instead of new born children. 
9 The Fear of Interference with Creation 
There is another more intuitive objection to surrogacy, which lies beyond 
moral argument: humankind fears to interfere with the nature. In our Western 
society God's Creation is seen as untouchable, and therefore people might have a 
more instinctive fear of surrogacy. Additionally, surrogacy involves human 
reproductive techniques, which cause general suspicion. There is the great fear, that 
humans can be manipulated and artificially 'produced' by these reproductive 
technologies, questioning our conception of the individuality and uniqueness of 
human beings, and therefore our concept of humankind itself. However, even if 
surrogacy, as set out above, might facilitate cloning, surrogacy itself does not bear 
the risk of manipulation of humans. The related concerns must rather be addressed 
by regulation which directly addresses the corresponding reproductive technology. 
I O Conclusion 
As a result of the social, ethical and moral evaluation, I come to the conclusion that 
most arguments are overstated and mostly also based on extreme scenarios which 
seem not to meet reality. However, there remain concerns which need to be 
addressed by regulation, especially the potential negative effects on children born 
through surrogacy arrangements and the risk of exploitation of poor women. These 
concerns can be addressed by directive regulation and therefore do not justify 
prohibition of smrogacy. 
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J The Right Approach 
As reflected by the international regulation outlined in Chapter III there are 
four main regulatory approaches towards surrogacy: Firstly, surrogacy can be 
allocated to a free market. Secondly, surrogacy can be totally prohibited. Thirdly, 
commercial surrogacy might be prohibited and only unpaid smTogacy allowed. 
Fourthly, it is possible to regulate the surrogacy market in detail. 
At the end of both the economic analysis and the social/ moral evaluation, I 
came to the conclusion that prohibition of smTogacy is not justified and that a 
regulated market might be the right answer. In the following, I am going to clarify 
my finding by applying the condensed form of my economic and social/moral 
analysis to the possible approaches. So far I have also neglected the third possible 
approach, namely to prohibit paid surrogacy, which I will discuss and reject in the 
following. 
1 Total Prohibition 
As shown above, there are both market failures and numerous moral and 
concerns about surrogacy, which need to be addressed. However, to prohibit 
surrogacy is neither justified from an economic point of view, nor from a social/ 
moral point of view. Moreover, a targeted intervention should be able to address all 
the concerns. 
In its 1986 guideline, the American Fertility Society came to the conclusion, 
that "potential problems with surrogacy can be assessed and accepted by those 
involved." It further stated that "sperm donation is largely accepted by society as a 
way around male infertility, and surrogacy could be acceptable as the equivalent for 
female infertility, 'unless it can be demonstrated to be significantly more risky to the 
participants or to society than [DI] or other activities that our society condones"'.
180 
I agree with this view. All reasonable concerns and risks can either be 
addressed or are too vague or immaterial to justify a total prohibition of surrogacy 
180 Downie, above n 23 , 141. 
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and do not outweigh the significance of the fundamental human rights of procreation 
and freedom of contract. 181 Furthermore, because of lack of children for adoption, 
and the strict selection criteria for adoptive parents, for many people surrogacy 
might be the only possibility to have children. 182 
Moreover, the prohibition of surrogacy could cause further problems. For 
example, when surrogacy is seen as illegal the children born through surrogacy 
might be stigmatised. 183 Additionally, as mentioned above, prohibition might lead to 
a black market and, thus, a greater risk of exploitation for poor women 184 
Consequently, I consider that prohibition is not the proper solution, but 
regulation in regard to surrogacy needs to take place in a more directed way. 185 
2 The commercial surrogacy - 'altruistic' surrogacy dichotomy 
Chapter III showed that there is highly divergent legal regulation at an 
international level. Nonetheless, there seems to be an international tendency m 
regulating surrogacy towards prohibiting commercial surrogacy as opposed to 
'altruistic' surrogacy. 186 I consider this distinction to be inappropriate. 
In contrary to paid surrogacy, 'altruistic surrogacy' is meant to take place 
between family members or other close relations, for example the sister or friend 
bearing a child for the infertile couple. It is perceived to be 'compassionate family 
surrogacy' and is regarded as a worthwhile act of charity. 187 This view wrongly 
assumes that there would be no problems at all, as the woman would act out of love 
and be happy to surrender the child, and that, thus, the general objections do not 
play a role. I regard this view of 'altruistic' surrogacy to be unrealistic. 
18 1 Value in ethics and economics, above n 98, 74. 
182 Value in ethics and economics, above n 98, 169. 
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184 
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Admittedly, the commodification argument, which is the most significant 
argument against paid surrogacy, and also other objections to surrogacy, as for 
example the possible exploitation of poor women, do not apply as there is no 
payment. 188 However, as mentioned above, I regard the significance of the 
commodification argument to be overestimated and the underlying speculation 
easily countered by reasonable restriction of the market. In respect to the 
exploitation argument, this can, as already argued, be addressed by directive 
regulation and not only by prohibition of payment. 
It is further feared that a paid surrogate would, because of her monetary 
interests, be less likely to disclose harmful behaviour or medical issues. 189 However, 
the problem of non-disclosure can easily be avoided by the parties themselves, as 
they can stipulate a compulsory health test, as already discussed within information 
asymmetries in the economic analysis. 
Aside from these objections, the concerns and the risks of surrogacy for the 
people involved remain largely the same. The potential negative effects for the 
children remain the same, whether there is payment involved or not. For example, 
the risk, that after their birth both the intended parents and the surrogate refuse to 
care for them, may also arise with 'altruistic' surrogacy. The same applies to 
possible psychological harm. Also the problem that the women might misjudge the 
psychological and physical effects can also occur with 'altruistic' surrogacy. 
Furthermore, especially the potential emotional exploitation with 'altruistic' 
surrogacy is underestimated, which is even more likely within close relationships. 190 
Hence, I suggest that 'altruistic' surrogacy also needs to be addressed by directive 
regulation, whereas allowing unpaid surrogacy and prohibiting paid surrogacy are 
not the right way. 
188 Wertheimer, above n 87, 224. 
189 Downie, above n 23, 154. 
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Whilst it is general accepted that sperm donors are awarded compensation, it 
is widely argued that a payment to surrogates is immoral. 191 However, there is also a 
strong claim that surrogates should be compensated for their long and intense 
involvement, which also involves greater inconvenience and bears greater risks than 
sperm donation. 192 Trebilcock even argues that paid surrogacy might lead to 
economic recognition of the "reproductive labour" and therefore not any longer be 
conceived as "uncompensated and assumed duty borne by women. 193 This argument 
is parallel to the recent notion that the economic value of women's housework needs 
to be recognised. 194 I agree with the view, that a woman who takes over the burden 
of pregnancy and bearing a child has the right to be financially compensated for her 
commitment. 
The underlying fear about commercial surrogacy is that it might become 'big 
business' and lead to "black market baby selling, breeding farms, turning 
impoverished women into baby producers and the possibility of selective breeding 
at a price." 195 The fear that the surrogacy market might tend toward those scenarios, 
seems to be the basis for many moral objections to surrogacy, for example the 
commodification or exploitation argument. Those scenarios are undoubtedly 
horrible and need to be prevented. However, these scenarios are worst case 
scenarios, which can be prevented by reasonable regulation and therefore 
prohibition is not necessary. 
Another problem with prohibiting paid surrogacy is that not enough 
'altruistic' women might be available to meet the demand. 196 This would mean that 
those infertile people who suffer greatly from their desperate wish for a child would 
not be catered for. 197 
191 Downie, above n 23, 155. 
192 See also Downie, above n 23, 155, Smith, above n 143, 26; Berg, above n 133, 194; Contested 
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3 Allocation to a free market 
As the economic analysis and the social/ moral evaluation have shown, 
allocating surrogacy to a free market is neither desirable from an economic point of 
view nor from an ethical one. The economic analysis revealed market failures which 
need to be addressed. Furthermore, the numerous social and moral concerns require 
at least some regulation of the market. Even if the concerns raised do not necessarily 
justify prohibition, there are risks for the people involved and the society as a whole 
which need to be addressed. 198 Apart from this, there are several problematic issues 
concerning the relation of the parties involved: What happens when a surrogacy 
contract fails? What rights and obligations do the parties have, both in relation to 
each other and the child? What happens if the child is born disabled? Who has to 
care for the child and is there room for liability for tort, when, for example, the child 
is disabled due to harmful behaviour of the surrogate? 199 Prohibition is not the 
answer, but we need legislation that directly addresses the potential negative effects 
and problems. Regulating surrogacy, however, means that a sophisticated set of 
legislation will be needed. 
V REGULATING SURROGACY 
So far I came to the conclusion that a regulated market might be the best 
approach to surrogacy. However, the remaining and difficult question is how such a 
regulation should appear in detail, especially to what degree or in which aspects 
surrogacy should be regulated. 
As will be shown in the following, both the scope of the surrogate market 
needs to be restricted and the performance and consequences of the surrogacy 
arrangement need to be regulated to address the risks and concerns examined above. 
However, it will also be shown that there are further risks and uncertainties for the 
people involved, which also need to be addressed.200 Moreover, regulating the 
market raises further delicate moral questions. In consequence, the individual points 
198 Downie, above n 23, 144. 
199 See also The Limits of Freedom of Contract, above n 2, 55 . 
200 See also Schuck, above n 30, 1805. 
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discussed for regulation are at least as controversial as the question of allowing or 
prohibiting surrogacy itself. 
One suggestion 1s to not specifically regulate surrogacy, but to use the 
legislation of contract law and family law already in place, as problems occurring to 
surrogacy could easily be solved with the standard legislation.201 However, as 
shown above and further examined in the following, there are several risks and 
concerns about surrogacy, which do not fit in the standard contract and family law, 
but need to be addressed.202 The current regulation is also, at least in regard to some 
issues, totally inappropriate. For example, no one would seriously suggest, using 
contract law, and thus to subsume a child with a birth defect under a defective 
product.203 
In the following I will explore the different suggestions for the regulation of 
each issue. As the proposals are, like the moral concerns, both conflicting and 
overlapping I focus on identifying the points which are discussed for regulation and 
give as structured an overview as possible. 
K The Scope of the Market 
In regard to the scope of the market the question for entry barriers arises in 
regard to all possible market participants: infertile couple, surrogate mother, and 
surrogate firms, and is meant to address different and overlapping risks and 
concerns of the surrogate market. 
I The intended parents 
It is agreed that the would-be parents need to be capable of providing a good 
and safe environment for the upbringing of the child, to avoid the risk of harm to the 
child to be born, as discussed above. Nevertheless, how the best interests of the 
201 The Limits of Freedom of Contract, above n 2, 53. 
202 See generally "Beyond Doctrinal Boundaries : A Legal Framework for Surrogate Motherhood", 
above n 45 , 2343 ; Contrast Garrison, above n 157, 157. 
203 See also Trebilcock, who also argues against leaving the resolution of surrogacy agreements to the present regulation. The Limits of Freedom of Contract, above n 2, 54. 
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child can be guaranteed and what requirements for the intended parents should be 
set in detail are challenging questions. 
(g) 'Fitness' and age issue 
As long as the intended parents are a heterosexual, married or co-habiting 
couple with an infertile female, the only really controversial questions are whether 
there should be a 'fitness' assessment or an age restriction. One suggestion is 
therefore to make a physical and psychological assessment obligatory.
204 
Others go 
further, and claim that the same strict screening as with adoption should be 
applied.205 Furthermore, an age restriction could be considered. 
From my point of view an age restriction or other legislative provisions that 
set out exact requirements would lead to a too inflexible regulation, which would 
leave no room for the circumstances of the particular case. As the reproductive age 
is varying from person to person, and it is also not unusual that men in their sixties 
still procreate, it is difficult to ascertain a certain age and subsequently the problem 
of age discrimination could arise. 
Nonetheless, I am of the opinion that a selection of intended parents is 
necessary, to avoid possible negative effects on children, as a result of unqualified 
surrogate parents. Accordingly, I favour the idea of an obligatory physicial and 
psychological screening to guarantee that the child is brought up in an adequate 
environment. So, the circumstances of the particular situation can be taken into 
account and simultaneously the risk of harm to children can be avoided. Even if 
such an assessment imposes costs on the parties, which need to be taken into 
account from an economic point of view, I regard them being outweighed by the 
above discussed advantages of the assessment. 206 
204 Downie, above n 23, 146 
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(h) Beyond Infertility 
Surrogacy might also be considered when a woman is not infertile, but does 
not want to become pregnant and bear a child for other reasons. Whilst the 
consideration of surrogacy seems, apart from infertility, also widely be accepted 
when there are serious health issues or the risks that the intended parents might pass 
on a genetic defect, it becomes more delicate when there are no or only minor health 
risks involved. Furthermore, possible incentives for women to consider the 
engagement of a surrogate can also be aesthetic or career reasons, or just that a 
woman do not want to bear the burden of a pregnancy.207 Even if a restriction in 
regard to these reasons would not directly address any of the concerns raised above, 
restriction for moral reasons is discussed and need to be considered. 208 
The Ontario Law Reform Commission, for example, recommended therefore 
regulating the market so that only infertile women are allowed to engage in 
surrogacy arrangements. It made a crucial point when it stated that surrogacy is 
meant "to respond to infertility, not to afford individual the opportunity to satisfy 
their lifestyle preferences.209 I widely agree with the Ontario Law Reform 
Commission in this notion and think that aesthetical or career reasons should be 
prohibited but I am of the opinion that women with reasonable health risks and 
inheritable illnesses should also be allowed to engage in surrogacy arrangements.210 
This requirement could also be guaranteed by the assessment mentioned above. 
(i) Homosexual couples, singles and transsexuals 
The issue becomes more contested when it comes to homosexual couples, 
single women or men and transsexuals. 
On the one hand, most Western legislation meanwhile accepts same-sex 
relations and unions. On the other hand, they are still stigmatised in the general 
207 Downie, above n 23 , 146. 
208 The exemption of ' life-style' reasons would probably also considerable restrict the market. As the 
exploitation of poor women is more likely with an extensive and (morally) unconstrained market, a 
restriction in regard to the reasons would diminish the risk of exploitation of poor women and also 
address the Commodification argument. 
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public opinion or at least regarded as an unacceptable environment for children.2
1 1
 
This suspicion also applies to transsexuals. Also, the traditional family model see
ms 
to be so deep-seated in the minds of most people, that there remains a great num
ber 
who think that children should, at least, not initially be raised by singles.
212 
In a 1986 Australian survey by the New South Wales Law Reform 
Commission, 70 per cent of the Australians would prohibit the engagement 
of 
213 
female homosexual couples, and 72 per cent the one of male homosexual couples.
 
In the same survey 49 per cent were also against single men and 45 per cent agai
nst 
. 1 b . hr h 214 srng e women ecommg parents t oug surrogacy. 
Despite the public opinion, the New Zealand legislature seems not to have an 
issue with lesbian couples in regard to reproductive technology, as can be seen fro
m 
section 19 of the Statues of the Children Act 1969, where, in relation to hum
an 
reproductive techniques in general, it is explicitly ruled that the woman who
 is 
donating the ovum is not the parent of the child unless she is the partner of the bi
rth 
mother at the time of conception.
215 
From my point of view, homosexual and lesbian couples and transsexuals 
should be allowed to engage in surrogacy arrangements, not at least in regard
 to 
antidiscrimination issues.
2 16 As long as potential harm to children is feared, and that 
is the only concern that might be addressed, I suggest that they should be obliged
 to 
the same psychological and physical assessment as every heterosexual couple, t
oo, 
as outlined above. 
211 See also Epstein, above n 92, 2324. 
212 
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This regulation was inserted by the Status of Children Amendment Act 2004, as fro
m I July 2005 . 
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995) 32 
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 613, 680 ["Testing the Limits of Freedom of Contract: 
The 
Commercialization of Reproductive Materials and Servieces"] They state that peop
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2 The surrogate mother 
The introduction of market barriers in regard to surrogates might address 
possible information failures and externalities, explicitly the potential negative 
effect on her family. 
In regard to possible information failures, it is claimed that surrogacy should 
be restricted to women who already have children.217 It is argued that thus only 
women who already know about the physical and emotional stresses and strains, and 
therefore are able to make an fully informed decision, can enter into a pregnancy 
contract.2 18 From my opinion, this restriction would be wrong. As already discussed 
under information asymmetries within the economic analysis, neither does the fact 
that women already have children mean that they are able to make fully informed 
decisions in any case, nor do women who do not have children necessarily misjudge 
the effects of the surrogacy arrangement. However, as women without children are 
more likely to underestimate the risks, the proposed regulation might be 
nevertheless reasonable, if there were not another, from my point of view better, 
regulative solutions to overcome potential information failures: Firstly, I favour an 
physical and psychological assessment of the surrogate, which should also include 
counselling and thus help the surrogate to make an widely considerate and informed 
decision. Secondly, I suggest that the surrogate should be allowed to change her 
mind, as even counselling can not fully circumvent information deficits, as will be 
discussed separately further below. 
Contrarily, it is argued that surrogates should be women without children to 
avoid potential negative effect on the surrogate's existing children. 219 That there is a 
remaining risk of possible psychological harm to the existing children of the 
surrogate is already discussed in the economic analysis under externalities. 
However, I regard this suggestion also to be the wrong approach, and suggest, that 
this problem should rather be addressed by the above suggested psychological and 
physical assessment of the surrogate. Additionally, such a general assessment would 
also help to prevent psychological and physical harm to the child to be born, as for 
2 17 Downie, above n 23, 145. 
2 18 Downie, above n 23, 145. 
2 19 Downie, above n 23 , 145. 
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example by declining an intended surrogate with an addiction problem. Therefore I 
see such an assessment as necessary to address the corresponding risks and 
concerns, and also justified in view of the costs it imposes on the parties. 
In regard to the discussion of a minimum age, in regard to the general notion 
that minors need to be protect, I am, in accordance with the Ontario Law Reform 
Commission, of the opinion that minors should be excepted.
220 I cannot see any 
reasonable ground to impose a higher minimum age. Even if the protection of 
minors is not a specific problem of surrogacy arrangements and also most 
jurisdictions already at least regulate that contracts in general are unenforceable 
against minors, I am, for clarification reasons, in favour of an explicit provision in 
regard to surrogacy arrangements.
221 
3 Private surrogacy agencies 
Private surrogacy agencies are private firms that conduct the matching of the 
intended parent(s) and the surrogate, provide the contract, cater for the medical 
conduct and often also offer counselling for the surrogate and the intended parents. 
Towards of the end of the 1970s and the beginnings of the 1980s, when there 
was no regulation of surrogacy, sixteen surrogacy firms were set up throughout the 
United States and in 1980 The New York Times wrote about a "whole new sector of 
the economy".2
22 This shows that in a free market private surrogacy agencies would 
flourish and so the question, whether these agencies should be allowed unrestricted, 
supervised, imposed with restrictions, or totally prohibited is highly contested. 
As those agencies are normally paid by the intended parents, it is feared that 
they might focus on the interest of the intended parents and therefore not sufficiently 
consider the interests of the surrogate and the child to be born. This concern could 
220 Downie, above n 23 , 145. 
22 1 See for example the New Zealand Minors' Contracts Act 1969, s 6 (1), which could however not 
apply to surrogacy when it is interpreted as service in accordance to section 5 (I) ( c) of this Act. 
Therefore, in regard to section 5 (I) ( c ), a clarification in New Zealand would be admirable. 
222 Gena, above n 27,214,217. 
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be addressed by imposing regulation and supervising private surrogate agencies.223 
Information failures in regard to the surrogate can be avoided by a rule that provides 
that the surrogate has to get independent advice and other counselling. 224 In regard 
to possible negative effects on the child, procedural rules for the selection of 
intended parents could be imposed. However, the remaining concern is that those 
restrictions will not be effective, as manipulation beyond those regulations can 
hardly be undermined.225 Therefore it is widely claimed, that private agencies 
should be prohibited and replaced by a state-run monopoly.226 
The greatest concern about private surrogate agencies is, however, that they, 
following their monetary interest, would facilitate the exploitation of women.227 
That this concern is quite legitimate is shown by the following statement: The 
president of an agency in the United states forecasted in an interview in the 1980s 
that " ... the price paid to women ... will come down once surrogate motherhood is 
more commonplace ... " as "the industry can then go to poverty-stricken parts of the 
country". He further speculated that with gestational surrogacy the "industry" could 
use women of third world countries and this could decrease the fee to $ 1,000.228 
Despite the 'double-bind' - the notion that poor women still would prefer to be 
exploited instead of earning no money -, the problem is that, with private agencies, 
an extensive and systematic exploitation might take place. 229 
Consequently, I consider that, even if it is contestable whether, in regard to 
the concerns about the child and information failures of the surrogate prohibition is 
necessary or regulation would sufficient address these concems,230 at least in regard 
to the risk of an extensive and systematic exploitation of poor women, private 
surrogacy agencies should be prohibited. 
A consequent problem could arise, as without agencies, which do the 
matching, it might be difficult for the contract parties to find each other and, thus, 
223 Value in ethics and economics, above n 98, 186. 
224 The Limits of Freedom of Contract, above n 2, 56. 
225 Value in ethics and economics, above n 98, 186. 
226 Value in ethics and economics, above n 98, I 86. 
227 Value in ethics and economics, above n 98, 187. 
228 Gena, above n 27, 214; Leibowitz-Dori, above n 34, 334. 
229 Radin, above n 89, 1929. 
230 To the suggestion to implement state-approved agencies see Discussion-Paper II, I I. 
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transaction costs might occur.
231 Yet, in modern times with plenty of support groups 
and online forums this should not be too difficult.
232 Furthermore the matching 
could also be taken over by welfare-organisations or by state-run agencies.
233 This 
service of welfare-organisations or the costs of state-run agencies could be financed 
by a fee paid by the parties. As far as transaction costs or search costs are concerned, 
the fees would more likely be less than the engagement of a private agency. 
L Precondition, Performance and Consequences of the agreement 
1 Precondition 
U) Screening and Counselling 
I suggest that an obligatory assessment of all parties involved would be a good 
solution. The remaining question is how this should be put in practice. The 
assessment could be left to private firms or conducted by welfare-organisation, 
hospital departments or state agencies. Private assessment firms, even when 
imposed by procedural regulation and supervised, might be more likely to approve 
parties, even if they are not qualified, because of monetary interests. The same 
problem might occur with hospital departments, who also might be focused on the 
money they gain from the medical procedure. Consequently, welfare-organisations 
might be a better solution and I am in favour that a corresponding state department, 
for example, a department of family affairs performs the screening. Thus, it could be 
assured that qualified psychologists and social workers conduct a proper procedure, 
who should additionally offer counselling, which will also be able to cope promptly 
with occurring problems and thus might help to avoid harm.
234 
23 1 Brinig, above n 39, 2393. 
232 See also Browne-Barbour, above n 6, 438; see also Levine, above n 42, 4. 
233 Value in ethics and economics, above n 98,186. 
234 
See also National Bioethics Consultative Committee (Australia) "Discussion Paper on Surrogacy 
2 - Implementation" ( l 990) 12. 
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(k) Court approval 
It is further discussed to have a court approval for the contract and to regard 
the contract as long as void until a judge affirms it.235 From my point of view this 
goes too far, and is also not necessary. Furthermore I regard a screening by 
specialists, such as psychologists and social workers to be able to deliver a better 
result, as a judge might lacks both sufficient knowledge and time to look close 
enough into the case. 
(1) Agreement of the husband/ partner 
It is also claimed that preconditions for the contract should be, that the 
husband or the partner of the surrogate consents to the contract. Thus, possible 
negative externalities on him, as discussed above, could be addressed. I think this 
goes too far, as he also does not have to agree when the woman, for example, 
engages in a full-time employment contract, even if this might also produce a 
negative effect on him. Nonetheless, as far as it is regulated that the husband or the 
partner of the surrogate is the legal parent of the child,236 he or she also needs to 
waive parental rights and thus agree to the contract.237 
2 The binding contract discussion 
One of the most contested issues in regulating surrogacy is the question 
whether the woman should be allowed to change her mind.238 The matter of the 
binding contract is mainly discussed in regard to the scenario, where the woman 
changes her mind after birth and wants to keep her child. However, there is a second 
issue, namely whether the surrogate who changes her mind before birth can undergo 
an abortion. 
235 Baugham, above n 125, 264; Brown-Barbour, above n 6, 446, Garrison, above n 157, 151 
(Footnote I 0). 
236 See for example Status of Children Act 1969 (NZ), s 5 (I), in regard to the husband; Status of 
Children Act 1969 section 18 (2) , as inserted by the Status of Children Amendment Act 1969, in 
regard to the partner. In regard to the partner is, however, requirement that he agreed to the 
procedure, section 18 (I) (c). 
237 Browne-Barbour, above n 6, 436, 437, see also Downie, above n 23, 158. 
238 "The Ethics and Economics of Enforcing Contracts of Surrogate Motherhood", above n 33, 
21. 
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(m) Keeping the child 
The problem that the surrogate wanted to keep her child was the subject in 
the famous Baby M Case decided in 1988 in the United States.
239 In 1985 Mrs. 
Whitehead signed a surrogacy aITangement with Mr Stern, agreeing to be 
inseminated with Mr Stem's sperm and to suITender the child to Mr Stern and his 
wife in return for US$ 10,000. After giving birth to the child Mrs Whithead refused 
to give up the child. After a long custody battle the court, also holding that the 
contract was illegal, granted the Sterns custody as to the best interest of the 
child."240 
Regulating that the suITogate is allowed to change her mind if she wants to 
keep the child after birth would address the information asymmetries of the 
suITogate explored within the economic analysis. Furthermore, also the risk of 
coercion could be balanced.
241 
In the end, the decision whether the anangement should be enforceable is 
about weighing the possible negative outcomes for the surrogate when the contract 
is made enforceable on the one hand, who may suffer having to relinquish her child, 
against the disadvantage to the intended parents, not obtaining a child when the 
surrogate changes her mind. In regard to the negative effect of the surrogate, studies 
about adoption have proven that women who gave their child away might suffer for 
the rest of their lives.
242 On the other hand, it is argued, that when the contract is not 
enforceable, the intended parents are disadvantaged, as they loose valuable time in 
their aim to obtain a child.
243 
Nonetheless, whether the surrogate should be allowed to change her mind 
seems to be affirmed from the majority of authors.
244 Downie makes the crucial 
point, when she argues that the intended parents have to bear this risk, and even if 
239 Baby M, I 09 N .J. 396 (S.C. New Jersey 1988). 
?40 - Baby M, 109 N.J. 396 (S.C. New Jersey 1988) 411. 
24 1 See also The Limits of Freedom of Contract, above n 2, 54; "Testing the Limits of Freedom of 
Contract: The Commercialization of Reproductive Materials and Services", above 216, 693. 
242 Kane, above n 2, xvii. 
243 
"The Ethics and Economics of Enforcing Contracts of Surrogate Motherhood" , above n 33, 
, 23 . 
244 For example Downie and Trebilcock, both advocating surrogacy, argue for allowing the surrogate 
to change her mind. Downie, above n 23 , 159; The limits of Freedom of Contract, above n 2, 54. 
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this can be seen as "harsh", it must be taken into account that the risk is not too high 
because of the low rate of surrogates who want to keep the child.245 I agree with this 
view. However the question remains how this should be regulated in detail. 
As shown above, New Zealand, like numerous other countries, already 
explicitly regulate that a surrogacy arrangement is not enforceable.246 Consequently, 
the surrogate can change her mind, and this is probably what the legislator primarily 
had in mind. However, this regulation means also that the surrogate cannot enforce 
her money,
247 
and might also lead to uncertainty and unfair results, for example in 
the case the women is changing her mind several times. 
Trebilcock seems to propose a better, as more detailed and thus uncertainty 
avoiding solution. He suggests that the women should be conceded a certain time 
spam, for example a couple of weeks, after the birth to change her mind: when the 
surrogate has surrendered the baby and after that time elapsing - analogous to 
consumer law regarding door-to-door sale - the contract is fully enforceable.248 A 
regulation of this kind, would both, avoid psychological grievance for the birth 
mother, as she can change her mind, in the case she misevaluated her bounding to 
the child and also give the prospect parents certainty of no further custody claims 
after this fixed time frame. 
Nevertheless, in the case the woman decides to keep the child, this regulation 
raises subsequent issues which need to be addressed to avoid uncertainty and 
resulting conflicts: Should she be allowed to get child support from the biological 
father? Should the biological father be granted visitation rights? Needs the surrogate 
to pay back money?249 To discuss all this issues in detail is beyond the scope of this 
paper, but in the end, even if some of these questions are difficult to decide, all this 
potential problems can be regulated. For example as to visitation rights: If the 
intended parent is the biological parent, there might be decided that the biological 
245 Downie, above n 23 , 159. 
246 Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004 (NZ), s 14 (I). 
247 In New Zealand, paid surrogacy is forbidden anyway. 
248 The Limits of Freedom of Contract, above n 2, 54; "Testing the Limits of Freedom of Contract: 
The Commercialization of Reproductive Materials and Servieces", above 2 I 6, 692. 
249 The limits of Freedom of Contract, above n 2, 56. 
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father has visitation rights but then also has to pay child support.
250 As to whether 
the surrogate should pay back the money, it is suggested that she should be legally 
forced to do so, so as to avoid the surrogate using the power of being able to 
repudiate the contract to demand more money from the intended parents.
251 
(n) Abortion 
Another question is whether the woman has the right to undergo an abortion when 
she changes her mind or whether she can be forced to continue with the pregnancy 
in accordance with her contractual obligation. According to Radin, a woman who 
chooses abortion has to be allowed to do so.
252 And also Trebilcock suggests that, as 
women with a 'natural' pregnancy have now such a right, surrogates should not be 
treated different.
253 I agree with this view. A woman who misjudged the effects of 
the pregnancy should be able to abort the child, to avoid violation of her autonomy, 
protected by privacy rights.
254 Moreover, to prevent serious psychological and or 
physical harm to her, the interest of the intended parents must, as discussed within 
the question whether she should be allowed to keep the child, take second place. 
3 Parental Rights 
Not at least in regard to who has the right to custody and who has the duty to 
care for the children, it is important that the parental rights are clearly defined. With 
surrogacy the crucial question is who is defined as the legal parent in time of birth. 
With 'partly' surrogacy this is not as complicated because the birth mother is the 
biological mother. Nevertheless, there is also a suggestion, the so-called '" consent 
intended" definition of parenthood, which "would declare the legal parents of a 
child to be whoever consented to a procedure that leads to its birth, with the intent of 
250 See also Garrison, who argues that the biological father might obtain visitation right through 
paternity action. Garrison, above n 157, 156. 
25 1 The Limits of Freedom of Contract, above n 2, 56. 
252 Radin , above n 89, 1934; Rao, 39 I. 
253 The Limits of Freedom of Contract, above n 2, 55 
254 
Radhika Rao "Property, Privacy, and the Humand Body" (2000) 80 B.U.L. Rev. 359 388 
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assuming parental responsibilities for it."255 This definition would lead to the fact, 
that the surrogate would at no stage become the legal parent.256 
The question gets more complicated with gestational surrogacy where the 
birth mother and biological mother are different persons. It needs to be decided 
whether the genetic link or the pregnancy and birth build the more relevant 
relationship.257 However, the New Zealand legislature decided this question without 
doubt in favour of the birth mother (and her partner, as far as he agrees).258 
This would mean, that the surrogate is the legal parent of the child until she 
'transfers' her parental rights. I favour the New Zealand regulation. The regulation 
that the surrogate is initially the legal mother also optimally matches the above 
suggested regulation, which concedes the surrogate a certain time period to change 
her mind. 259 
4 Restrictions of possible control over the surrogate 
As one concern is that the woman's autonomy during the pregnancy might 
be unacceptably restricted through corresponding contractual decisions, it is 
suggested to regulate "that only those constraints on the mother that are 'reasonably' 
targeted to insuring the health of the baby will be allowed".260 To avoid an 
unacceptable intrusion in the surrogate's privacy, I favour this restriction. 
255 Value in ethics and economics, above n 98, 174. This has, for example, been regulated in 
Arkansas, United States. Brown-Barbour. 449. 
256 Value in ethics and economics, above n 98, 174. 
257 Kane, above n 2, xvii; See general Rae, above n 133, 81; Elizabeth Baxter Legislative Research 
Service, Department of the Parliamentary Library (Australia) "Surrogate Mothers: The Legal Issues" 
(1984) Current Issues Brief No. 4, 8. 
258 Statues of the Children Act 1969, section 17 (2), inserted, as by I July 2005 by the Statues of the 
Children Amendment Act 2004. In regard to the partner Status of Children Act 1969 s 18 (2), section 
18(l)(c). 
259 "The Lessons and Limits of Law and Economics", above n 85, 692. 
260 Baugham, above n 125, 290; Garrison, above n 157, 153, Eppstein, above n 92, 2334. 
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5 Contract failures 
(o) Miscarriage or stillbirth 
One question is what happens when the woman suffers a miscarriage or the 
baby is stillborn, and whether a regulation is required. In some contracts this is 
already foreseen , and the payment is differentiated: the woman gets in this case only 
a part of the full payment when the baby is stillborn and a lesser part if she 
miscarries.261 This shows that this can be easily contractual regulated and, therefore, 
I suppose that a regulation is not necessary. 
(p) Birth defects 
A disabled child has always been the greatest fear of prospective parents, and 
having to make the decision whether to abort a child with a defect is generally seen 
as one of the worst things that can happen to pregnant women. Dealing with these 
situations gets the more complicated with a surrogacy arrangement and demands a 
detailed regulation. 
(i) Abortion 
When during the pregnancy it turns out that the child has a defect there are 
two scenarios which might occur and cause conflicts between the contract parties: 
The woman wants to carry on with the pregnancy, whilst the intended parents want 
her to undergo an abortion. Conversely, it might occur that the surrogate wants to 
abort the child whilst the intended parents would like to have the child nonetheless. 
As already discussed, in regard to the surrogate' s autonomy and possible 
psychological and physical harm, I hold the view that she should be forced neither 
to abort nor to continue the pregnancy.
262 This should be explicitly regulated to 
circumvent opposed contractual provisions. 
261 Downie, above n 23, 126. 
262 See also "The Lessons and Limits of Law and Economics", above n 85, 695 . Contrast Epstein, 
above n 92, 2336. 
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(ii) Care for a disabled child 
An even more complex issue is the worst case scenario, when the baby is 
born with a birth defect: Who is responsible for the child? This controversial issue 
has been brought before the courts in 1983 in the international recognized Malahoff 
v Stiver Case.
263 In this case the surrogate gave birth to a child with an abnormality. 
In consequence, both the father and the surrogate refused the child and just left it at 
the hospital. Subsequently, the father filed a US$ 50 million claim against the 
mother for breaking the contract. There was a twist to the case, when it turned out 
that the contracting man was not the biological father, but the surrogate's 
husband.
264 
Nevertheless, the case raised the question, what should happen when the 
contractually conceived baby is disabled. Should the contract father be forced to 
take the baby? Or can he refuse the baby as a faulty product and it should be the 
responsible of the surrogate to care for the baby? 
According to Downie, this is solved with a clear definition who the legal 
parent at each stage is, as it is already proposed above.265 However, it does not 
entirely solve the question who has physically and/or financially to care for the 
children. Furthermore, just to make the responsibility for the child dependent on the 
legal parenthood would ignore the whole circumstances of the surrogacy 
arrangement. 
Trebilcock, asking and negating the question whether the intended parents 
should have the right to "renounce" the child, argues that "the contract contemplated 
from the outset that they would assume responsibility for the child after birth, and as 
in the case of natural parents in a traditional marriage, they must take the risks of 
conceiving or helping conceive a child in circumstances different from those which 
obtain subsequently or of conceiving a child that is disabled.266 
Radin suggest that neither the intended parents should be obliged to bring up 
a child they do not want, nor should the surrogate be forced to keep and care for the 
263 Ma/ahojfv Stiver (1992) U.S. App. LEXIS 34150 (6th Cir). 
264 Downie, above n 23, 132. 
265 Downie comes in result to the same suggestion as proposed in this paper and in according with the 
New Zealand legislation. Downie, above n 23, 158. 
166 The Limits of Freedom of Contract, above n 2, 55, 56. 
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child she intended to surrender.
267 Radin further states that the intended parents 
"should bear the responsibility for providing for the child's future in a manner that 
can respect the child's personhood and not create the impression that children are 
commodities that can be abandoned as well as alienated."
268 I agree with the view 
that the intended parents should care for the child. However, I cannot follow the 
distinction Radin wants to make between personal and financial care. As the couple 
initiated the birth of the child they should be responsible, as they would be when 
they naturally conceived a child. If they do not want to raise the child themselves, 
they have, as 'normal' parents, to find a proper placement for the child and bear the 
cost. 
The question arises, whether this must be decided differently and the 
surrogate should have the duty to care for the child, when the birth defect is caused 
through harmful behaviour of the surrogate. I suggest that also in this case the 
intended parents should be in duty to care for the child. To avoid harm to the child, 
it is necessary that the question of who has to care for the child is clearly decided. If 
it would be ruled that normally the intended parents are in duty, but the birth mother 
is responsible if the disability is caused by her behaviour, a court battle would be the 
consequence in many cases, both parties blaming the other and the risk is high that, 
as in the Malahoff v Stiver case, the child is left behind. Consequently, I suggest a 
corresponding legislative regulation, which clarifies that the intended parents have 
to care for the child. 269 
(iii) Liability for damages 
An even more complicated and resulting question is whether the surrogate 
should be liable for damages in regard to the child and the surrogate parents, when 
the child is disabled because of her harmful behaviour during the pregnancy. So far 
in our society 'natural' children cannot sue against their mothers when they are 
disabled through harmful behaviour, therefore, I suggest that there should be no 
difference in regard to surrogacy. 
267 Radin, above n 89 1934. 
268 Radin, above n 89, 1935. 
269 See also Schuck, above n 30, 1805. 
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In regard to the intended parents, harmful behaviour might be a breach of 
contract. However, even though the surrogate receives money, whether she should 
be liable for damages is a difficult question. The problem is that various, sometimes 
even considerate behaviours of the pregnant woman can cause damage to the child 
and it would lead to an extensive and unjust liability, if the surrogate could easily be 
made liable for damages, when something goes wrong in the pregnancy, which 
could be caused by her behaviour, and the distinction is difficult to draw. In this 
regard, also her right to privacy and personal freedom must be taken into account. 
On the other hand, when she acts deliberately, there might be room for damages. 
Therefore I would suggest that the woman should only be liable for damages, when 
it is proven that she deliberately harmed the child. 
( q) Changed circumstances of the intended parents 
A further question is what should happen when the circumstances of the 
intended parents change, so that they do not want the child anymore. This could 
happen, when a couple divorces or a split up during the pregnancy, or a single 
person suffers financial or health problems or just changes his or her mind. There 
are two subject matters arising again: Firstly, can they force the surrogate to abort 
the child and secondly can they just refuse to care for the child. 
In regard to abortion, eventually, this question is already answered within 
previous matters. The decision whether to abort the child or not should be left to the 
surrogate. In this regard, it also does not make a difference whether the child is 
disabled or the intended parents change their mind for other reasons. 
As to the care of the child, there can also be no difference to whether the 
parents reject accountability because the child is disabled or for other reasons. As 
the parents have to care for the child when it is disabled, a fortiori they have to care 
for it even if they do not want it anymore for other reasons, which lie within their 
sphere.270 
270 See also Th e limits of Freedom of Contract, above n 2, 56. 
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6 The child's right to find out about its origin and visitation rights 
Another question arising is whether the child born to a surrogate should have 
the right to access information about its birth mother and also, where applicable, its 
genetic heritage. As now regulated in New Zealand,
271 from my point of view, the 
children born through surrogacy should have the right to find out about both their 
birth mother and their genetic heritage.
272 
7 Conclusion 
Summing up, in regard to entry barriers, I suggest that private surrogacy 
agencies should be prohibited, and that there should be an age restriction in regard 
to minors, and also a restriction in relation to the reasons for women engaging a 
surrogacy. In regard to determine which surrogates and parents should be allowed 
to engage in such an arrangement, I come further to the conclusion that an 
obligatory physical and psychological assessment of all parties involved would be a 
good solution. This could be conducted by a state health department, which should 
also offer counselling during the time of the conduct. 
In regard to the precondition, performance and the consequences, I came to 
the following further suggestions: The birth mother and her partner/ husband should 
be the legal parents in time of birth. Consequently, the partner/ husband of the 
surrogate needs to agree to the contract. It should be explicitly forbidden, that the 
surrogate is in any case forced to abort the child or continue the pregnancy. The 
surrogate should also be conceded a certain time after birth, for example a couple of 
weeks, where she can change her mind and keep the child. To prevent contractual 
abuse, the possible control of the intended parents over the surrogate should be 
restricted to reasonable constraints. If no one wants the child, the care of the child 
should fall to the intended parents. If the child is harmed through harmful behaviour 
during the pregnancy, the surrogate should only be liable for damages, if she 
271 
Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004 (NZ), s 4 (e). 
272 See also "The Lessons and Limits of Law and Economics", above n 85 , 679. They authors 
suggest that the child should have access as far as they are grown up and the surrogate or the donor 
consent. 
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deliberately harmed the child. Finally, the child should have the right to find out 
about its genetic heritage and birth mother. 273 
These suggestions are intended to provide a tentative regulative framework 
and to point out that a reasonablly detailed regulation is possible. It neither contains 
all a.rising and debatable issues, as this is beyond the scope of this paper, nor do I 
claim to provide an objective answer to the various points. Rather, I regard a 
normative moral judgement to be impossible. There are even not moral standard 
frames that can be applied, as moral values in our society "are both conflicting and 
overlapping".
274 
Therefore, in the end, it would remain to the respective legislator to 
find his own answers to the numerous arising issues. 
VJ CONCLUSION 
This paper has shown that a targeted intervention should be able to address 
both the market failure and the social/ moral concerns. Surrogacy has the potential 
to be mutually beneficial to all parties involved, provided that that there is a clear set 
of laws and the parties are aware of the legal rules as well as the risks involved 
Therefore, in contrast to the tendency in international regulation, the prohibition of 
paid surrogacy as opposed to 'altruistic ' surrogacy is not justified. 
However prohibition of commercial surrogacy seems to be chosen because 
of two main reasons: Firstly, it is very difficult to choose a form of intervention, as 
every single issue is highly controversial. In recent years, numerous ethical and law 
reform committees have been examining the regulation of surrogacy and came to 
very different results and suggestions. Secondly, regardless of which form of 
interventions is chosen, it will evoke severe criticism. A free surrogacy market is, as 
discussed, also not an alternative option, as there are too many risks and concerns 
for the people involved and the society as a whole, which make governmental 
intervention necessary. Therefore, prohibiting paid surrogacy seems to be the easier 
solution. 
273 See for a divergent suggestion for regulation Rae, above n 133, 170. 
274 Baugham, above n 125, 267 . 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
54 
To foresee the future of the sun-ogacy market seems to be difficu
lt, 
especially in regard to the fast advancing reproductive technology. 
Scientists 
throughout the world are, for example, already experimenting on the devel
opment of 
artificial wombs.
275 These might make surrogacy obsolete in the future, so that the 
surrogacy might be a temporary appearance; alike wet-nurses who are no
t required 
anymore.2
76 However, an artificial womb would obviously raise many similar issues 
as with surrogacy. 
In light of the fast advancing reproduction technology, it might be better the 
legislator start to deal with the individual subjects raised by surrogacy arra
ngements 
early. Especially, as it is questionable whether they can just react with proh
ibition in 
along run, taking into account that the advancing technology will impose 
increasing 
pressure on the legislator to respond in a more directive way instead of pr
ohibition. 
275 
However, this research seems, for example, to be prohibited in New Zeala
nd. Human Assisted 
Reproductive Technology Act 2004 (NZ), s 9 (2) (b) (i). 
276 
With the introduction of the baby bottle and a substitute for mother's milk
 wet nursing 
disappeared. Gena, above n 27, 240, 258. 
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